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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DONALD L. HURLBURT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs .

)

Case No. 860135

JOHN A. GULLO and ROSETTA
FOOTE,
Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

The following issues of law are presented within the
brief of Appellant:

(1)

Was the Plaintiff's oral notice of his election

to exercise the five-year extension option within the April
18, 1983 lease agreement a violation of controlling statute
of frauds provisions governing real estate transactions?
(2)

Did the April 18, 1983 handwritten lease

agreement evidence specific mutual party intent so that it
is capable of enforcement?
(3)

Did each Defendant have both actual and

constructive notice of the April 18, 1983 written lease

notwithstanding that the lease was not recorded or a
similar notice of interest was not recorded in the Office
of the Weber County Recorder?
(4)

Can the Plaintiff establish damages which will

permit a judgment to enter in favor of Plaintiff and
against each Defendant?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff commenced this action after the Defendant
Foote sold to the Defendant Gullo the real property covered
by the April 18, 1983 handwritten lease agreement made
between the Plaintiff and the deceased husband of the
Defendant Foote.

The Defendant Gullo assumed immediate and

exclusive possession of the subject real property thereby
terminating the balance of the Plaintiff's leasehold
interest .
Plaintiff's Complaint alleges damages against each
Defendant for the the value of improvements which he made
to the real property, for overhead costs and for prospecttive damages based upon lost profits.

The Defendants

jointly filed a Motion to Dismiss and alternative Motion
for Summary Judgment following the completion of pre-trial
discovery within which interrogatories were served upon and
answered by Plaintiff and in which the depositions upon
oral examination were taken of the Plaintiff and of each
Defendant.

The Defendants1 alternative motion against the
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Plaintiff alleged the multiple grounds that:
(1)

The April 18, 1983 handwritten lease was so

vague, unspecific and ambiguous that it did not constitute
a valid and enforceable lease,
(2)

No meeting of the minds occurred between the

Plaintiff and the named Defendants which would constitute
an enforceable lease,
(3)

No notice of interest or other recording was

made against the subject real property so that each
Defendant never acquired actual or constructive notice of
the lease agreement,
(4)

The Plaintiff cannot establish damages.

The trial court ordered Summary Judgment in favor of
each Defendant and against Plaintiff for the reason that
the Plaintiff's oral notice of his election to exercise the
five year extension option within the handwritten lease
violated the statute of frauds, UCA §25-5-1 (1953, as
amended).

The lease was accordingly held to be a year to

year lease which the Defendant Gullo lawfully terminated
without damgages to the Plaintiff.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The events and circumstances at issue in this action
are focused on an April 18, 1983 handwritten lease document
signed by Mr. Hurlburt and Mr. Donald C. Foote, the
deceased husband of the Defendant, Rosetta Foote.
Foote died May 27, 1984.

(Foote dep. at 4, Ex. 2)
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Mr.
The

April 18, 1983 lease agreement identifies an approximate
five acres of real property with water rights located at
1805 W. 400 N., Slaterville, Utah.

(Foote dep, Ex. 2)

The

identified real property is that acreage which was then
owned by Mrs. Foote and her husband in joint tenancy.
(Foote dep. at 6)

The property and the residential home

located on it had been acquired by the Footes in 1961.
(Foote dep. at 5)

From the inception of the Footes1 own-

ership, the property has had located on it a home and a
garden extending approximately fifty feet from the rear of
the home.

The balance of the property, consists of approx-

imately three and

one-half acres.

(Foote dep. at 4)

This

three and one-half acres has been continuously separated
from the home and garden by an old fence and a ditch which
traverse the property on an east/west line.

The right-of-

way fence for Interstate 15 forms the southern boundary of
the property with the east and west side boundaries similarly fenced. (Foote dep. 4, 11) The three and one-half
acre parcel to the south of the home had been used for
farming by the Footes throughout their twenty-two year
ownership of the property.

(Foote dep. at 5)

The

configuration of this three and one-half acres, to include
the perimeter boundary fences and the location of the
irrigation ditch, have remained unchanged throughout the
Footes1 ownership of the property.
11-12)

(Foote dep. at 5,

The Footes had likewise acquired with their
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ownership of this approximate five acre parcel of property,
two and one-half shares of irrigation water representing
approximately one hour of irrigation time.

(Foote dep.

16-17)
Mr Hurlburt met with the Footes at their home during
the first part of April 1983 to negotiate for his lease of
the approximate three and one-half acres located behind and
to the south of the Foote home.

(Foote dep. 10-11)

Mr.

Hurlburt wanted to lease the property to obtain additional
hay production for livestock owned by him as well as to
generate income through the sale of hay not required for
his own livestock purposes.

(Hurlburt dep. at 13)

The

Footes were receptive to Mr. Hurlburtfs offer for the
reason that the three and one-half acres had not been
farmed for the previous four years, Mr. Footefs health
would not allow him to resume farming operations and Mr.
Hurlburtfs use of the property would upgrade it.
dep. at 10-11; Hurlburt dep. at 13)

(Foote

The Footes asked Mr.

Hurlburt to prepare a written lease agreement to raemoralize
the essential aspects of the lease transaction, to provide
for Mr. Hurlburt to lease the three and one-half acres for
an initial one year term payable in an annual instalment of
$150.00 with an option to lease the real property for an
additional five year term upon the same terms and conditions.

(Foote dep. at 14-15: Hurlburt dep. at 21-22)
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The

Footes advised Mr. Hurlburt that the home and the garden
area behind the home were excluded from the lease.
(Hurlburt dep. at 22)

Mr. Hurlburt returned to the Foote

home on April 18, 1983 with a handwritten lease agreement
which had been prepared between him and his wife.
(Hurlburt dep. at 21)

The lease agreement was reviewed by

both of the Footes and signed by Mr. Foote at their home
with Mr. Hurlburt present.

Mrs. Foote did not sign the

lease but no particular or conscious reason exists for why
she did not.

(Foote dep. at 14-15)

Mrs. Foote understood

fully the controlling terms of the lease agreement.
dep. at 12, 13, 15-16)

(Foote

Mr. Hurlburt plowed, disked and

planted oats on the leased property during the Spring of
1983.

(Foote dep. at 18, 10; Hurlburt dep. at 24-26)

He

likewise tendered the $150.00 lease payment for 1983 with a
$75.00 payment in the Spring and a $75.00 payment in the
Fall.

(Hurlburt dep. at 29; Foote dep. at 19).
Mr. Hurlburt gave notice of his election to exercise

the five year lease option in the early Spring months of
calendar year 1984 at which time Mr. Hurlburt used a land
plane and tractor on the leased property to level its
surface and to fill a depression at the south end of the
property where surface water had previously collected.
(Hurlburt dep. at 25)

Mr. Hurlburt then disked the leased

property, prepared it for planting and drilled it with an
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alfalfa-oats combination.

(Hurlburt dep. at 25-27)

Mrs.

Foote received from Mr. Hurlburt during that spring the
scheduled $75.00 lease payment
Foote died on May 27, 1984.

(Foote dep. at 19)

(Foote dep. at 4)

Mr.

Following

Mr. Footefs death, Mr. Hurlburt met with Mrs. Foote and
paid to her the remaining $75.00 for the 1984 lease payment.
(Foote dep. at 21-22)

Mrs. Foote at that time committed to

Mr. Hurlburt that he should continue to farm the property.
(Foote dep. at 21)

Mrs. Foote believed the April 18, 1983

lease agreement was a valid contract whose terms were
binding upon her and which vested Mr. Hurlburt with a
remaining four years to farm the leased property under his
oral notice of his election to exercise the five year extension.

(Foote dep. at 22)

Mr.

Hurlburt harvested one

hay cutting from the leased property during 1984.

This

cutting produced between 200 to 250 bales of hay averaging
between 60 to 65 pounds per bale.

(Hurlburt dep. at 28-29)

Mr. Gullo approached Mrs. Foote during December 1984
with a written offer to buy the entire five acre tract.
(Foote dep. at 23, 25-26)

The documents submitted by Mr.

Gullo did not identify the Hurlburt lease nor did Mrs.
Foote at that time discuss the Hurlburt lease with Mr.
Gullo.

(Foote Dep. at 26)

Mrs. Foote did not act upon the

December 1984 purchase offer made by Mr. Gullo other than
to review the documents with her immediate family.
dep. at 26)

(Foote

Mr. Gullo next met with Mrs. Foote at her home
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during the early part of April 1985 with a second written
offer to purchase the entire five acres.
19)

(Foote dep. at

Mrs. Foote then informed Mr. Gullo of the Hurlburt

lease and that four years remained under its five year
option term.

(Foote dep. at 30). Mrs. Foote did not

specifically identify the April 18, 1983 lease agreement
nor did she produce a copy of it for Mr. Gullo.
dep. at 30)

(Foote

Mrs. Foote's position with Mr. Gullo was that

the Hurlburt lease was a binding commitment upon her which
had to be acknowledged within any sales transaction for her
property

(Foote dep. at 27, 30)

Mr. Gullo then informed

Mrs. Foote that he would either honor the Hurlburt lease or
make appropriate restitution.

(Foote dep. at 30-31)

Mr. Hurlburt met with Mrs. Foote at her home during
April 1985 and following Mr. Gullo's April 1985 purchase
offer to Mrs. Foote.

(Hurlburt dep. at 30)

Mr.. Hurlburt

tendered the spring 1985 $75.00 payment which payment Mrs.
Foote did not take because of her pending sales negotiatins
with Mr. Gullo.

(Hurlburt dep. at 30, 32))

Mr. Hurlburt

then inquired if she had informed Mr. Gullo of the lease to
which Mrs. Foote replied that she had informed Mr. Gullo of
Mr. HurlburtTs lease and that Mr. Gullo had informed her
that he would either honor the lease or buy it.
dep. at 33)

(Hurlburt

Mr. Hurlburt thereafter unsuccessfully

attempted to telephone Mr. Gullo.

Similarly, Mr. Hurlburt

received no communication from Mr. Gullo.
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(Hurlburt dep.

at 33)
Mr. Hurlburt again met with Mrs. Foote at her home
during the last week of April 1985 to further inquire about
the progress of the sales negotiations btween her and Mr.
Gullo.

(Hurlburt dep. at 37)

Mrs. Foote stated that she

had committed to sell the entire five acre tract, that the
sales negotiations were at the closing stage and that funds
would be disbursed through United Savings and Loan.
(Hurlburt dep. at 37-39)

Mrs. Foote asked Mr. Hurlburt for

a copy of the April 18, 1983 handwritten lease agreement
because she had been unable to locate hers.
at 37)

(Hurlburt dep.

Mr. Hurlburt provided Mrs. Foote that day with a

copy of the lease.

(Hurlburt dep at 37). Mr. Hurlburt

likewise went directly to the Gullo home to confer with Mr.
Gullo but was unable to find anyone at the house.
(Hurlburt dep. at 38-39)

Later that same day, Mr. Hurlburt

met with the loan disbursing officer at United Savings and
Loan and there showed him a copy of the April 18, 1983
lease agreement.

(Hurlburt dep. at 40). The loan officer

informed Mr. Hurlburt that Mrs. Foote would be adivsed not
to negotiate any portion of the net sale proceeds until the
status of the Hurlburt lease was resolved.

(Hurlburt dep.

at 37)
The sale of the Foote property to Mr. Gullo was
closed on May 2, 1985 at United Savings and Loan.
dep. at 7)

(Foote

The closing was attended by Mr. Gullo and Mrs.
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Foote.

The Hurlburt lease was not discussed or identified

by anyone attending the closing.

(Foote dep. at 34)

No

communication occurred between Mr. Gullo and Mr. Hurlburt
prior to the May 2, 1985 sale closing date.
at 31)

(Hurlburt dep.

The closing was not attended by Mr. Hurlburt nor

was he advised of its date.

(Hurtlburt dep. at 37-40)

Following the May 1, 1985 closing, Mr. Gullo
informed Mr. Hurlburt by letter that he was assuming
exclusive possession of the property.

Mr. Gullo thereafter

moved horses onto the three and one-half acres and since
May 19&5 has asserted exclusive possession.

(Hurlburt dep.

at 34-35)
Mr. Hurlburt met with Mrs. Foote at her home
immediately folloiwng Mr. Gullofs placement of horses on
the property covered by the Hurlburt lease.
at 35)

(Hurlburt dep*

Mrs. Foote confirmed that the sale had been

completed, that the United Savings and Loan loan officer
had advised her to negotiate her sale check and that Mr.
Gullo had earlier appeared at her home and informed her
that all issues surrounding the Hurlburt lease had been
satisfactorily resolved.

(Hurlburt dep. at 34-36), 41)

But for the identified letter received by Mr. Hurlburt from
Mr. Gullo, no communication has ever occurred between the
two men to either resolve or to acknowledge the issues
presented by the April 18, 1983 lease agreement.
dep. at 31-32)
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(Hurlburt

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred as a matter of law by holding
that the Plaintiff's oral notice of his election to exercise the five year option term within the handwritten April
18, 1983 lease violated the statute of frauds provisions
within UCA §25-5-1 (1953, as amended).

The handwritten

lease does not require Mr, Hurlburt to exercise in writing
the five year extension option.

Mr. Hurlburtfs oral notice

of his election to exercise the five year option provided
for the same performance and payment conditions which had
controlled the parties during the first year of the lease.
Case law confirms that a lessee who orally exercises a
renewal option does not violate the statute of frauds for
the reason that the lessee holds for the extended term
under the original lease and not under the notice.
The April 18, 1983 lease agreement evidences an unequivocal mutual intent between two parties for the lease
of real property.

Parol and extrinsic evidence is admiss-

ible to clarify any ambiguity or vagueness within the lease
agreement to the extent that party intent cannot be reasonably ascertained.

The handwritten lease does contain

limited ambiguity in that: (1) the lease agreement
identifies five acres whereas the leasehold was actually
confined to three and one-half acres, (2) the lease
agreement identifies the property by street address and not
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by legal property description, (3) the lease agreement does
not define the initial term as one year after which the
five year extension option could be exercised, and (4) the
quantity and source of irrigation water for the leased
property is not identified within the lease agreement.

The

uncontradicted evidence, however, is that Mr. Hurlburt and
the Foote's clearly and unequivocally understood always
their mutual rights and obligations.

The Defendant Foote

and her husband each knew that the lease covered only the
three and one-half acres to the rear of the home which
acreage had always been marked by the same boundary fences
and ditch during their entire twenty-two year ownership of
the property.

Each of the Footes and Mr. Hurlburt knew and

had agreed that the initial lease term was for one year
with the five year extension option to thereafter apply.
Similarly, the irrigation water covered by the lease was
that which the Footes had acquired and used on the property
throughout their entire ownership tenure.

Mr. Hurlburt and

the Footes performed under the April 18, 1983 written lease
for two years without interruption, without dispute and
without any need to clarify their respective rights and
obligations.

Claims of ambiguity and vagueness within the

written lease were never raised by either Mr. Hurlburt or
either of the Footes until after Mr. Gullo purchased the
property in May 1985.

Mr. Gullo originated the arguments

of ambiguity and vagueness.

Such arguments ignore that Mr.
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Gullo had actual knowledge of the existence of the lease
when he bought the property but that he failed and refused
to investigate.

The Utah Supreme Court has liberally

allowed parol and extrinsic evidence to ascertain party
intent where such intent cannot be derived with reasonable
certainty from the four corners of the writing.

The use of

such parol and extrinsic evidence is proper in this action
to develop and ascertain fully party intent.
Immaterial to this action is whether or not the
April 18, 1983 handwritten lease was recorded or a similar notice of interest was recorded in the Office of the
Weber County Recorder.

The terms and conditions of the

lease are enforceable between Mr. Hurlburt and Mrs. Foote
because she participated in and approved the lease negotiations, accepted lease payments from Mr. Hurlburt for two
years to include one year within the five year extension
option, she confirmed to Mr. Hurlburt that the lease was
binding upon her following the death of her husband and she
advised Mr. Gullo that his purchase of the property was
subject to the Hurlburt lease.

Actual notice of the lease

from Mrs. Foote to Mr. Gullo was sufficient to place Mr.
Gullo on reasonable notice and to obligate him to further
investigate the competing interest of Mr. Hurlburt.

Mr.

Gullofs failure or refusal to investigate, as a matter of
law, does not relieve him from honoring the Hurlburt lease.
Mr. Hurlburt itemized within his Answers to Interrogatories and within his deposition upon oral examination
-13-

the nature and extent of damages incurred by him from the
Defendants1 wrongful termination of the lease.

The cumu-

lative computation for Mr, HurlburtTs damages exceed twenty
thousand dollars and derive from overhead costs, investment
expenditures incurred from his projected six year use of
the lease property and for lost profit within the balance
of the leasehold term.

The damages sought by Mr. Hurlburt

are compensatory, are reasonably foreseeable from a breach
of the parties' lease agreement and cover the types of
damages which are recoverable in a breach of contract
action .
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE PLAINTIFF'S ORAL NOTICE OF HIS ELECTION TO EXERCISE THE
FIVE YEAR EXTENSION OPTION WITHIN THE APRIL 18, 1983 LEASE
AGREEMENT WAS NOT A VIOLATION OF CONTROLLING STATUTE OF
FRAUDS PROVISIONS GOVERNING REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS.
Mr. Hurlburt gave the Foote's oral notice of his
intention to exercise the five year extension option during
the spring of 1984 and prior to the onset of the calendar
year 1984 farming season.

The April 18, 1983 lease

agreement does not specify how or in what manner Mr.
Hurlburt was required to provide the Footes with notice of
his election to extend the lease for an additional five
year term.
notice.

The lease agreement does not require written

Mr. Hurlburt had completed the first year within

the five year extension term when Mr. Gullo completed his
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May 2, 1985 purchase of the real property.

Mr. Hurlburt

had further tendered to Mrs. Foote the first instalment for
the calendar year 1985 lease payment which payment she had
not accepted because of the then pending sales transaction
with Mr. Gullo.

In awarding Summary Judgment to each of

the Defendants and against Plaintiff the trial court ruled
from the bench at the conclusion of oral argument by
respective counsel as follows:
My interpretation of the contract is that
it is a lease for one year with an option
to renew for five years. Generally the
law would be that to exercise an option
for a five year lease, that would have to
be done in writing or it would be in
violation of the Statute of Frauds.
I think the argument under some
circumstances could be made that part
performance in furtherance of exercising the five year option would take
it outside the statute but my understanding is the case law would suggest
that that would be a matter of equity to
avoid unjust enrichment and would not
apply in a case like this where you are
asking enforcement and money judgment.
• • .

I think the statute of frauds
applies. (sic) I don't think the option
was exercised in writing, and I donft
think it is enforcible. (sic)
I will grant the Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment. (Addendum to
Appellant's Brief at 33)
The trial court erred as a matter of law by holding
that Mr. Hurlburt's oral notice of his election to exercise
the five year extension within the handwritten lease
violated controlling statute of frauds provisions within
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UCA §25-5-1 (1953, as amended).

Case law confirms that a

lessee who orally exercises his renewal option does not
violate the statute of frauds for the reason that the
lessee holds for the extended terra under the original lease
and not under the notice.

The controlling legal standard

is set forth within an American Law Reports annotation
captioned, Sufficiency of Notice of Exercise of Option to
Renew Lease, 51 ALR2d 1404,1407 (1957), as follows:
Verbal notice of the exercise of an option
to renew a written lease is generally held not
to come within the statute of frauds, for the
reason that the contract between the parties is
embodied in the original lease, the writing of
which is sufficient to meet the requirements of
the statute. And in a proper case, the lessor
may be estopped from pleading the statute of
frauds even though the original lease might not
have complied with the requisite. (citations
omitted)
Case law authority confirms that a lesseefs oral
notice to exercise a renewal or extension option within a
written lease agreement does not violate controlling
statute of frauds provisions, especially where the lease
agreement does not require written notice for the option
to be exercised:
Gruber v. Castleberry, 23 Ariz.App. 322,
533 P2d 82( 1975)(Oral notice of election to exercise
an option for renewal of a written lease does not
violate statute of frauds - such result obtains on
the theory that terms and conditions of the contract
are embodied in the lease, which is in writing and
the only effect of the notice is to make the
original lease operative for the renewal period.)
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Contintental Builders, Inc. v. Leach,
625 P2d 5 (Kan.App. 1981)(Oral notice of election to
exercise option for renewal of written lease does
not violate statute of frauds.)
Prince Enterprises, Inc. v. Griffith Oil Co.,
664 P2d 877 (Kan.App. 19«3)(Where renewal of lease
is upon same terms and conditions as original
lease, which is in writing, original lease is
thus embodied in agreement to renew and it
satisfies written requirement of statute of
frauds.)
Kern v. Pawlega, 5 Mich.App. 384,
146 N.W.2d 689( 1966) (Tenant's oral notification
of exercise of option to renew lease containing
provision that tenant had right of lease
renewal for additional five years, satisfied
statute of frauds.)
Ripani v. Liberty Loan Corp. of Carmichael,
157 Cal.Rptr. 272, 95 C.A.3d 603 (Cal.App.1979)
(Where original lease with option to renew was
in writing and properly executed by lessee,
exercise of option to renew lease did not
violate statute of frauds inasmuch as original lease satisfied statute.)
Daehler v. Oggoian, 72 111.App.3d 360,
390 N.E.2d 417 (111.App. 1979)(Unlawful detainer action brought by building owner and
new tenant against old tenant, testimony
offered as to oral statement or statements
used to renew lease through exercise of alleged
renewal option in original lease was not
hearsay and did not violate statute of
frauds and thus such testimony was competent
to show lessee had exercised his option and
acquired renewal lease.)
The writing requirement within the statute of frauds
provisions of UCA §25-5-1 was not violated by and did not
vitiate the oral notice provided by Mr. Hurlburt to the
Footes that he was exercising his option to extend the
April 18, 1983 lease agreement for a five year term commencing with the Spring of calendar year 1984.

-17-

POINT 2
THE APRIL 18, 1983 HANDWRITTEN LEASE AGREEMENT DOES
EVIDENCE SPECIFIC MUTUAL PARTY INTENT AND IS NOT SO VAGUE,
UNSPECIFIC AND AMBIGUOUS THAT IT IS INCAPABLE OF
ENFORCEMENT,
Defendants urge that the April 18, 1983 lease agreement is vague and uncertain in its essential terms and
accordingly incapable of enforcement.

A corollary of this

argument is that the mutual intent of the parties cannot be
ascertained from the language contained within the document
with the result that a contract was never made.

Plaintiff

concedes that the April 18, 1983 lease agreement does
contain ambiguous terms.

The lease property is identified

as approximately five acres whereas the Plaintiff!s
leasehold interest was confined to three and one-half acres.
Second, the leased property is identified by a street
address and not by a legal property description.

Third,

the lease agreement does not define the initial terra as one
year after which the five year extension can be exercised.
Fourth, the quantity and source of irrigation water is not
identified within the lease agreement.

The uncontradicted

evidence, however, is that Mr. Hurlburt and the Footes
clearly and unequivocally understood their mutual rights
and obligations.

Mrs. Foote and her husband knew that the

Hurlburt lease covered only the three and one-half acres
located to the rear of the home.

This acreage had been

farmed continuously by the Footes during their twenty-two
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year ownership of the property and its boundaries had
always been marked by the same fencing and the lateral
ditch to the rear of the home.

Mrs. Foote similarly

understood that Hurlburtfs lease would run for an initial
one year term with an option for a five year extension.
The Hurlburt lease represented an uncomplicated lease
agreement made between two rural neighbors for Mr.
Hurlburtfs farming use of a specific and identifiable piece
of unimproved real property.

The complexities of improved

real property commerical leasing agreements were never
present within the transactions between Mr. Hurlburt and
the Footes and were never

considered by either of them.

The conduct of Mr. Hurlburt and the Footes further confirms
that the mutual rights and obligations evidenced within the
April 18, 1983 lease agreement were comprehensively and
unequivocally understood.

Mr. Hurlburt and the Footes

performed under the terms of the April 18, 1983 lease
agreement without controversy and without interruption for
two years.

Within the two year period that the lease

operated, Mr. Hurlburt exercised the five year extension
option in the Spring of 1984 and neither the Footes nor Mr.
Hurlburt ever sought a clarification of their mutual rights
and obligations nor did any disruption or dispute over the
interpretation of lease rights and obligations ever occur.
Claims of ambiguity or vagueness within the April 18, 1983
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lease agreement were never raised by any party to the lease
until Mr. Gullo purchased the property in May 1985 and
thereafter determined that Mr. HurlburtTs claims for
damages were unreasonable and excessive.

Mr. GulloTs legal

argument that the April 18, 1983 lease agreement is
unenforceable for vagueness and ambiguity fails to
acknowledge that the parties to the lease agreement
understood their mutual obligations and interests and
so conducted themselves for a two year period until Mr.
Gullo dispossessed Mr. Hurlburt from the leased property in
May 1985.
The Utah Supreme Court has liberally allowed the
admission of parol and extrinsic evidence to ascertain the
intent of parties to real property convenayces and leases
where such intent cannot be derived with reasonable
certainty from the terms of the writing.

This rule of law

has been expressed by the Utah Supreme Court in Coleman v.
Butkovick, 500 P2d 503, 505 (Utah 1976) as folows:
It is not to be questioned that in order to
be valid, a deed must contain a sufficiently definite description to identify the property it
conveys. (Citations omitted) But the rules which
are generally applicable to controversies over the
meaning of documents are also applicable to deeds.
The problem lies in ascertaining the intent with
which it was executed. (Citations omitted) It
should be resolved, if possible, by looking to the
terms of the instrument itself and any reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom; and if there then
remains uncertainty of ambiguity it can be aided by
extrinic evidence. (Citations omitted) If from
that process the property can be identified with
reasonable certainty, the deed is not invalid for
uncertainty. (Citations omitted)
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The cited rule of law has been further clarified by
the Alaska Supreme Court in Shilts v. Young,
567 P2d 769, 773 (Alaska 1977)
The general rule, however, is that where
possible, deeds will be made operative and
the intentions of the parties given effect.
A deed is not void for uncertainty of description if the quantity, identity or
boundaries of the property can be determined by reference to extrinsic evidence.
(Citations omitted) Such evidence may
include parol and subsequent conduct of the
parties as well as other documents. (Citations omitted) There appear to be few restrictions on the use of extrinsic evidence in
ambiguous or uncertain deed cases. . .
The following Utah Supreme Court decisions evidence
the extent to which the Court has allowed parol and
extrinsic evidence to clarify ambiguous intent within lease
documents and related real property conveyance writings:
Russell v. Valentine,
14 Utah2d 26,376 P2d 548 (1962) (lease provision
providing that lessees should have right to renew
lease "for a further period" rendered the provision
ambiguous and uncertain - plaintiff allowed to
introduce extrinsic evidence)
Davison v. Robbins, 30 Utah 2d 338,
517 P2d 1026 ( 1973) (oral and extrinsic evidence
admissible for the purpose of identifying the land
described and applying the description to the
property)
Russell v. Park City Utah Corporation,
548 P2d 889 (Utah 1976) (ambiguity in language of
lease as to whether right of first refusal was to
survive lease's termination - extrinsic and parol
evidence admitted to determine intention of parties)
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Corbet v. Cox, 30 Utah2d 361, 517 P2d 1318 (1974)
(memorandum providing that lessor
had received
"$150,00 for first year lease on lots facing
main highway in west part of St. George, Utah"
with a "5-year option to purchase said land for
the sum of $5,000.00 cash" language deemed to
be ambiguous - parol and extrinsic evidence
allowed to determine to which of the three lots
the lease agreement and option to purchase
applied)
Commercial Building Corporation v. Blair,
565 P2d 776 (Utah 1977) (parol evidence admitted to show intention of parties where language
of contract may be vague and uncertain - such
evidence cannot be permitted to vary or contradict plain language of contract)
Also see,
Thurman v. Trim, 443 P2d 367 (Kansas 1967)
(action to enjoin lessors with interfering with
lessee's use of lease property - lease description encompassed only 200 acres of the 230 acres
actually owned by lessor - lease description
further erroneously contained 10 acres not
owned by lessor and further erroneously omitted
an additional 50 acres owned by lessor - parol
evidence was admissible to show the premises
intended to be demised - parol evidence established that parties understood the property
being leased in spite of the inaccuracy of the
description in the lease - subsequent party
performance used to confirm party understanding)
Any ambiguity and uncertainty present within the
April 18, 1983 lease agreement can be resolved by parol and
extrinsic evidence.

Parol and extrinsic evidence exist

within this action to demonstrate that Mr. Hurlburt and the
Footes clearly and unequivocally understood their mutual
rights and obligations under the April 18, 1983 lease
agreement.

The result follows that the May 2, 1985 sale of

the Foote property to Mr. Gullo is subordinate to the
Hurlburt lease.
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POINT 3
EACH DEFENDANT HAD BOTH ACTUAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF
THE APRIL 18, 1983 WRITTEN LEASE NOTWITHSTANDING
THAT THE LEASE WAS NOT RECORDED OR A SIMILAR NOTICE OF
INTEREST WAS NOT RECORDED IN THE OFFICE OF THE WEBER COUNTY
RECORDER.
The Defendants argue that the April 18, 1983 lease
agreement was not recorded in the Office of the Weber
County Recorder and that a notice of interest was otherwise
not recorded evidencing the existence of the lease agreement.

They urge that Mr. Gullo bought the property without

notice of the claims and interests of Mr. Hurlburt.

This

argument misstates the law and the actual notice of the
Hurlburt lease which was provided to Mr. Gullo by Mrs.
Foote not less than two weeks in advance of the May 2, 1985
sale date.

The April 18, 1983 lease agreement is not

legally defective merely because it was not recorded in the
Office of the Weber County Recorder or a notice of interest
was otherwise not recorded.

The terras and conditions of

the April 18, 1983 lease are enforceable between Mr.
Hurlburt and Mrs. Foote.

Actual notice of the Hurlburt

lease provided to Mr. Gullo by Mrs. Foote was sufficient to
place Mr. Gullo on reasonable notice to further inquire
into the competing interest of Mr. Hurlburt.

Mr. Gullo

either intentionally or negligently failed to investigate
or further inquire.

Mr. Gullofs failure to act does not

relieve him from honoring the Hurlburt lease.
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Tarpey v. Desert Salt Co., 5 Utah 205, 14 P2d 338 (1887)
(ordinarily a conveyance of land is valid between the
parties and as to all parties having actual notice thereof
without being recorded); Gappmayer v. Wilkenson,
53 Utah 236, 177 P. 763 (1918) (where purchasers of real
estate had actual notice of adverse of claims of plaintiffs
as would put reasonable person upon inquiry to ascertain
what interest was, they took subject to any equities or
interest that plaintiffs had in premises though such
interest was not recorded); Latses v. Nick Floor, Inc.,
99 Utah 214, 105 P2d 619 (1940) (actual knowledge - duty to
inquire).
Mr. Gullo's May 2, 1985 purchase of the Foote property did not displace the Hurlburt lease.

Mr. Gullo was

provided with actual notice of Mr. Hurlburtfs interest with
actual notice rendering immaterial any legal argument that
the lease or that a notice of its existence was not
recorded.
POINT 4
PLAINTIFF CAN ESTABLISH DAMAGES WHICH WILL PERMIT A
JUDGMENT TO ENTER IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST EACH
DEFENDANT.
Mr. Hurlburt has itemized in written form the nature
and extent of damages incurred by him from the Defendants'
wrongful termination of the lease.

The itemization

of these damages are fully set forth within Exhibits 1 and
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2 of Mr. Hurlburtfs September 18, 1985 deposition.

The

cumulative amount of these damages exceed $20,000.00.

The

damages sought by Mr. Hurlburt reflect overhead and investment expenditures incurred for his anticipated minimum six
year use of the property and for lost profit.
The general rule in contract law is that damages
recoverable for breach are those which arise naturally from
the breach and which reasonably may be supposed to have
been within the contemplation of the parties or which are
reasonably foreseeable.
pensatory in nature.

Such damages are essentially com-

Robbins v. Finlay,

645 P2d 625, (Utah 1982); Pacific Coast Title Insurance Co.
v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 7 Utah 2d 377,
325 P2d 906 (1958).

Likewise, the general objective of

tort law is to place an injured person in a position as
nearly as possible to the position he would have occupied
but for the defendant's wrongful conduct.
Acculog, inc. v. Peterson, 692 P2d 728 (Utah 1984).

The

Utah Supreme Court has confirmed that overhead costs and
investment costs are recoverable in either a breach of
contract action or a business interference action based on
tort.

Miller Pontiac v. Osborne, 622 P2d 800,

803 (Utah 1981); Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson,
692 P2d 728 (Utah 1984); Even Odds, Inc. v. Nielson,
22 Utah 2d 49, 448 P2d 709 (Utah 1968).
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The Utah Supreme

Court has further confirmed that damages for lost profits
are also recoverable.

Penelko, Inc. v. John Price

Associates, Inc., 642 P2d 1229 (Utah 1982); Acculog, Inc.
v. Peterson, supra.

The recovery of damages for overhead

and investment expenditures as well as lost profits must be
based upon evidence that provides a sufficient basis for
estimating damages with reasonable certainty.

Evidence of

damages is sufficent for proof of lost profits and overhead
expenditure where the plaintiff provides the best evidence
available to him under the circumstances.

While the

evidence must not be so indefinite as to allow the jury to
speculate to the amount of damages, some degree of
uncertainty is tolerable and anticipated.
Cook Associates, Inc. v. Warnick, 664 P2d 1161 (Utah 1983);
Winsness v. M J Conoco Distributors, Inc.,
592 P2d 1303 (Utah 1979); Penelko, Inc. v. John Price
Associates, Inc., supra.
The injury and resulting damages which Plaintiff has
identified are damages which by subject matter and amount
naturally flow from and are reasonably foreseeable for the
wrongful termination of the Hurlburt lease.

The Defendants

emphasize that some of Mr. Hurlburtfs damage calculations
are not derived from contemporaneous business record
entries.

Defendants urge that the Plaintiff's recollection

of man hours spent and the time to which he committed his
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machinery and equipment cannot constitute recoverable
damages absent such business record entries.

This argument

incorrectly equates recollection with speculation.

Mr.

Hurlburtfs deposition isolated specific man hour times
coupled with specific hourly rate of pay evaluations and
applied these components to specific activities completed
by him for the improvement and management of the leased
property.

Such testimony is not speculative.

It has

provided the Defendants with the means to challenge or
confirm both the nature and extent of the work performed
and the actual cost or fair value of such work.

Mr.

Hurlburtfs calculation of lost profits is based upon his
personal farming experience with the production of a hay
crop and his knowledge of the price at which baled hay is
sold upon the open market.

Mr. Hurlburt confirmed that he

had anticipated only one hay cutting from the leased
property during calendar year 1984 but thereafter
anticipated that the property would yield three to four
cuttings per year of hay dependent upon weather conditions.
Mr. Hurlburt provided the Defendants with the basis for his
calculations that the property would support between 200 to
250 bales per cutting. Portions of the Plaintiff's damages
are based upon recollection and calculations not derived
from business records but such evidence is not derived from
speculat ion.
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CONCLUSION
The February 7, 1986 Order of Summary Judgment
entered in the District Court of Weber County should be
reversed with this action remanded for trial on the merits
DATED this 7th day of October, 1986.
Respectfully

s<iDmii

PATTERSON AN$ PATTERSON}

P H I I I p l c . F|TTERSON~
Attorney fo* Appellant
427 - 27th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
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January 15, 1986

HULBERT vs. FOOTE

THE COURT:

1

My interpretation of the contract is that

2 tt is a lease for one year with an option to renew for five years
3 Generally the lav/ would be that to exercise an option for a

i

4 five year lease, that would have to be done in writing or it
5 fould be a violation of the Statute of Frauds.
I think the argument under some circumstances could be

6

7 made that part performance in furtherance of exercising the five
3 year

option would take it outside the statute, but my understanding

9 Is the case lav/ would suggest that that would be a matter of
10 tequity to avoid unjust enrichment, and would not apply in a case
11 (Like this where you are asking enforcement and money judgment.
12

Also it would appear from the facts as presented in your

13 lotion, and both Motions, that unjust enrichment wouldn't lie
14 Ln this case.
15 property.

The plaintiff simply had the right to use the

He paid a certain amount.

16 the benefit of his crop.
17 jLs an argument here
18

He used it, and he reaped

I don't find that unjust enrichment

that can be advanced to get around the statut^

I think the statute of frauds applies.

I don't think the

19 bption was exercised in writing, and I don't think it is
20 enf orcible.
21
22
23

' I will grant the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment,
lr. Sabin, you prepare the Finds and Order.
MR. SABIN:

Yes, I will.

24 Patterson for approval as to form.
25

THE COURT:

Alright.
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I will submit it to Mr.

